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Abstract 
The report describes the importance of oil for oil exporting countries and analyses the potential economic effects 
that current low oil prices may have in their economy and political stability. Firstly, the report describes the main 
drivers that have led to the present low oil prices. Secondly, descriptive statistics are employed to show the 
exposure of the main oil exporting countries to the oil price, where GDP and government revenue is found to be 
closely correlated to the oil price. In general, several Sub-Saharan African and North African countries show high 
risk due to the high exposure of their economy and of their government revenue combined with limited reserves 
per capita. Secondly, the macro-economic effects of a 60% fall in the price of oil is analysed with the GEM-E3 
model, which is an stylized representation of the oil market change over the last two years. The results show that 
such an oil price drop has different effects across oil exporting countries, unsurprisingly strongly correlated with 
export dependence to oil. For instance, a 60% fall in the price of oil could lead to a reduction of the GDP of Sub-
Saharan Africa by around 8.5%. The final section discusses the migration patterns from the studied countries, as 
a proxy of what might happen be they destabilised because of a lasting low oil price. 
ii 
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Executive summary 
This report describes the importance of oil for oil exporting countries. It assesses the 
economic consequences of the current low oil price level on the main oil exporting 
economies. 
Historically, in a context of unevenly distributed global reserves and very different 
structure of extraction costs, varying expectations on the dynamics of demand and 
supply have led to a high volatile price pattern. 
The oil price experienced a sustained rally upwards from the 30$/bl level of 2004 to a 
maximum of about 140$/bl reached on the verge of the 2007 crisis, mainly boosted by 
the growing demand from fast-growing economies in Asia and beyond. After a sharp 
decline in 2008, prices went up to a relatively stable price range between 100 and 120 
$/bl for about 3.5 years (January 2011-June 2014). The oil price plummeted again from 
mid-2014 onwards and reached a minimum level of 26 $/bl in January 2016. Since then, 
prices have been slowly going up to an average of about 35$. 
The main drivers that have led to the present low oil prices include the weakening  of 
demand growth from some large Asian importers, the availability of new resources 
(conventional or not), the strategic behaviour of some large-reserve / low cost 
producers, the appreciation of the US Dollar, and the anticipation of emerging 
technologies seen as possible substitutes of oil in the transport sector.  
Most oil exporters from Middle-East and Africa have marginal production costs lower 
than current oil price. Hence, their production level could be largely maintained if the 
price is not to decrease further. However, this is not the case of other producers, 
especially those producing large quantities of unconventional oil (for instance Canada or 
USA), which may see their production levels being reduced in the future. 
Descriptive statistics show the exposure of oil-exporting countries to the changes in oil 
price and oil exports: GDP and government revenues (per capita) in most Middle-East 
and Africa producers are found to be linked to oil price evolution, with the elasticity of 
government revenues to oil price being close to 1 for a number of countries.  
 Most Gulf countries have a very high share of fossil fuel related sectors in the
economy (50-65%) and show high elasticity of both GDP and Government
revenues to oil price.  This indicates a high specialisation towards oil, and a low
degree of diversification of the economy towards other industries or the service
sector. However, countries like United Arab Emirates have started to diversify
their economy over the last decade (UAE now only depends for about 20%
directly on fossil fuels). As most Gulf countries have high oil reserves per capita
combined with very sizeable Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) compared to the size
of their economy they may relatively well weather the current oil price slump on
the short and mid-term.
 Iran has a slightly more diversified economy compared to the other countries of
the region, but it is still highly dependent on the fossil fuel sector (30% of GDP,
high elasticity of Government revenue to oil price) and its SWF and reserves per
capita are limited. This makes the country vulnerable for shocks on the oil
market, as was shown by the Iran oil embargo (applied in 2012-2015).
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 In North-Africa, Libya has relatively high reserves per capita, while those of 
(more populated) Algeria are very low. Their economies are still highly dependent 
on the fossil fuels sectors (about 30% from the oil & gas sector, high elasticity of 
GDP and Government revenue to oil price) and their SWFs are limited. This 
makes these countries vulnerable for a long period of low oil prices. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, Angola and the smaller producers depend for 
about 20-30% on the fossil fuel sector and show a very high elasticity to oil price 
for their GDP (most countries) and their Government revenues (all countries). 
Their SWFs are virtually non-existent while the reserves per capita are very low. 
This makes these countries very vulnerable for lower periods of low oil prices.  
 
The macro-economic GEM-E3 model analyses a 60% price fall, which is a stylized 
representation of the oil market change over the last two years. The results show that 
such an oil price drop has different effects across oil exporting countries, unsurprisingly 
strongly correlated with export dependence to oil. For instance, a 60% fall in the price of 
oil could lead to a reduction of the GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa by around 8.5%. Russia’s 
negative impact would lie around 4.4% and in Central Asia and Caucasus to 15.2%. 
Traditional oil producers would also have a substantial negative impact (-14.5% for 
Saudi Arabia and about -8.6% for Kuwait and the UAE), softened in their case by the 
substantial size of their reserves per capita, relative low exploitation costs, and large 
SWFs. 
 
This analysis attempts to assess possible migratory flows due to potential political and 
economic instabilities in oil exporting countries. Out of 54 million migrants living in the 
EU, 20 million is internal migration between EU countries, while only 10% come from oil-
exporting countries. Among these: Iran, Iraq, Angola, Nigeria and above all Algeria have 
the highest presence in Europe. Historical and cultural bonds between EU Member States 
and countries of origin matter. Portugal has a large community from Angola; most 
Nigerians settled in the UK; and France has a large Algerian community. This may be a 
proxy of which EU Member State may receive most of the migration if emigration picks 
up in one of the oil-exporting countries. 
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1 Recent Evolution of Crude Oil Price 
 
This first chapter in this report describes the main drivers for the steep drop in oil prices. 
Between June 2014 and March 2016, the monthly average price of Brent crude oil fell 
from 112 $/bl to 32 $/bl (Figure 1). A sharp decline took place between June 2014 and 
January 2015 (-60%). In the first half of 2015, the price of oil stabilized around 60 $/bl. 
However, from mid-May 2015 on, the price of oil continued falling and, in January 20th 
2016, reached 26 $/bl. Since then the price has slightly increased to reach 38 $/bl on 28 
March 2016, for an average price of 33 $/bl over January – March 2016. 
Figure 1: Daily oil price 2004-2016 (Brent, current US$)  
 
Source: EIA
1
, latest data point: 2
nd 
April 2016 
There is no consensus in the literature on the fundamentals of this oil price fall (see e.g. 
Baumeister and Kilian, 2016; Bloomberg Business, 2016a; Baffes et al 2015; Husain et 
al, 2015; Pflüger, 2015; Arezki and Blanchard, 2014); however most studies find that 
the oil price decline was driven by a combination of several factors, the most important 
being: 
1. Global oil production: Unexpected changes in oil production are generally important in 
explaining oil price fluctuations. The development of US shale oil production increased 
global oil production and, thus, could have pushed down the oil price. According to EIA 
database, US field production of crude oil increased by 67% from 2011 to 2015, making 
the US the largest producer in the world surpassing Saudi Arabia and Russia. Likewise, 
higher than expected production in Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia may have affected oil 
prices since 2014. In particular, Saudi Arabia announced it was abandoning its role of 
"swing producer" for the oil market in November 2014, , maintaining output 20% above 
20110 level, a production increase not seen since the early 1990s. This change of policy 
                                               
1 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
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from Saudi Arabia may be motivated by its ambition to maintain market share which 
may guarantee present revenues, given its favourable extraction costs profile compared 
to other important producers (in particular, the US). 
2. Global oil consumption: a decline in (expected) oil consumption can also explain the 
drop in oil prices. Some authors argue that since mid-2014 economic growth has been 
weaker than expected in Europe and Asia, which, combined with policy measures aiming 
at spurring energy efficiency, led to lower-than-expected demand having pushed down 
the price of oil2.  
3. Crude oil inventories: the relative dynamics of supply and demand over the past 2 
years translated into stocks changes unusually positive in 2014-2015 (almost 1 Mbl/d in 
2014 and 2 Mbl/d in 2015, see IEA 2016b), sending a strong signal of abundantly 
supplied oil market. 
4. US dollar exchange rate: The US dollar is the main currency for the global oil trade, 
therefore, it is argued that fluctuations in the exchange rate may lead to oil price 
fluctuations. The appreciation of the US dollar makes crude oil more expensive for the 
rest of the world, reducing oil demand and leading to lower oil prices expressed in (more 
expensive) US dollars.  
What about future evolution of the oil price? Current prices are too low for some 
producers which will have to decrease output (Figure 2), reducing the current 
oversupply3. Subsequently, unless the demand for oil decreases, lower production would 
then lead to higher prices. However the adjustment time lag is uncertain and may take a 
few years, even if the observed evolution of the market shows that it is already 
adapting: US production has recently declined (EIA 2016b) and the IEA (2016b) 
estimates that non-OPEC production would contract by 2% in 2016. The oil market is not 
expected to be rebalanced until 2017 (IEA, 2016a).   
In the meantime, the effect of the present level of oil prices is affecting high-cost 
producing countries. Within Europe, the North Sea, with the break-even price for many 
fields around $60, is a vulnerable zone. Last January,  BP announced a 4000 job 
reduction over 2016. Further to its merger with BG in February, Shell also plans to cut 
2800 jobs during this year. Profits and dividends are contracting also. 
Overseas, the situation is similar: according to Wood Mackenzie oil consultant,  68 oil 
projects with a combined investment cost of $380bn have been dumped over the last 
year at global level. The situation is particularly severe for the expensive US oil shale 
operating companies where an increasing number of company are going bankrupt (69 
                                               
2 Lower oil consumption can also result from a surge of cost-effective alternatives to conventional 
technologies, especially in the transportation sector where most oil is consumed. However, wide-
scale substitution of oil by other fuels in vehicles has not yet materialised: in 2015 liquid biofuel 
represented around 2% of world liquid fuel consumption (IEA, 2016b), while electrical vehicles 
represented only 0.5% of total sales (US DOE (2016), OICA (2016)) and an even lower share of 
total vehicles in circulation. 
3 In recent months, investments in the oil sector are declining, in particular in relatively high cost 
production areas such as US shale oil, Canadian oil sands, deepwater and the Arctic. According to 
EIA, US mining and exploration investment declined 35% in 20153 (EIA, 2016d).  Likewise, IEA 
(2016a) reports that global oil exploration and production capital expenditures fell by 24% in 2015 
and estimates a decline of 17% in 2016.  Some even fear an oil shock as the historic decline in 
investment may put at peril future supply (Bloomberg Business, 2016b) 
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North American producers between the beginning of 2015 and April 2016, according to 
Haynes and Boone (2016)), while analysts have warned half of US shale drillers could be 
put out of business if prices go below the 30$/bl. 
In terms of demand, about 50% of global oil production fuels 98% of the global 
transport sectors. The immediate effect of low price is an additional disposable income 
that can propel consumption of other goods, services and investments. Undoubtedly, it 
could lead also to an increased oil consumption and deteriorate the attractiveness of 
energy saving technologies. Despite the slow-down of the Chinese economy in recent 
years, the IMF (WEO, 2015) foresees that population and economic growth will push up 
oil demand growth in non-OECD countries. The record sales of (large) vehicles in the 
USA in 2015 also indicate that consumption might also increase in OECD, or at least 
stabilise as compared to the decrease observed since 2005. On the longer term the 
implementation of more efficient technologies and the substitution of petroleum products 
may affect the oil market even though, views on when and how are very diverse. For 
instance estimates of the future deployment of electric vehicles range from 1% of total 
energy consumption in transport by 2035 (BP, 2016) to more optimistic prospects 
(Whitmore, 2016) like 35% of new light duty vehicle sales by 2040 (Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance, 2016a). Labat et al. (2015) estimate that in a scenario that would keep 
global warming below 2°C, in line with the objective of the UN climate Paris Agreement 
of 20154, electricity would account for 16% of total energy consumption in road 
transport by 2050 (EC JRC, 2015).  
The high uncertainty on both oil production and oil demand makes difficult the 
assessment of future oil price. Futures markets can be useful to predict oil prices in the 
short-term, but they are not necessarily good at predicting in the long-term (Levi, 
2015). In the short-term, EIA (2016c) estimates that Brent crude oil will average 34 $/bl 
in 2016 and 40 $/bl in 2017, slightly below the price in futures markets. Baffes et al 
(2015) state that oil prices are likely to remain low over the medium term, they could 
range between 60 $/bl and 70 $/bl. In the long-term projections show that Brent crude 
oil would range between 100 $/bl and 150 $/bl in 2030 (expressed in $2014, see IEA 
2015 and EIA 2015) depending on the strength of international climate policies. 
  
                                               
4 UNFCCC: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf 
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2 Vulnerability of oil exporters to low oil price 
 
This section analyses the impact of the observed price decrease on oil exporting 
countries. In section 2.1, descriptive statistics are employed to determine the main oil 
exporting countries and identify their exposition to the oil market. Section 2.2 briefly 
sets out the specifics of the oil price scenario studied. The economic impact of a lower oil 
price is reported in section 2.3.  
Most oil exporters from Middle-East and Africa have marginal production costs lower 
than current oil price (Figure 2), meaning that their production level should only be 
marginally affected if the price is not decreasing further, particularly if many investments 
may have been mortgaged already . This is not the case of other producers, especially 
those producing large quantities of unconventional oil (for instance Canada or USA), 
which may see their production being reduced5. As a consequence, it is assumed that, 
for the countries of interest in this report, production will remain relatively unchanged 
and the analysis should focus on the impact of oil price change alone. 
Figure 2. Marginal production costs (2014) vs. Brent price 
 
Source: Knoema.com (2016), EIA 
   
2.1 Oil exporting countries 
We identify in Table 1 the world's contributors to globally traded oil (i.e. not including oil 
production that is consumed domestically). Four regions are differentiated: North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle-East and "Other" producers from CIS, Americas and Europe 
(Norway). Countries are ranked by their importance in the oil market within each region. 
In 2014, the 28 listed countries made up 100% of the world net exports of crude oil 
while their total production represented 70% of global oil production (BP, 2015). The 
share these countries represent in all exports is also illustrated in Table 1. 
                                               
5 Actually the US crude oil production has already slightly reduced since April 2015 (see EIA 
2016b). 
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Table 1: Oil exporting countries (2014) 
Country ISO3 
code 
Region % of net 
exports 
% of 
production 
Reserves 
(Gbl) 
Population 
(M) 
Saudi Arabia SAU Middle-East 19.0% 13.0% 267 31 
United Arab Emirates ARE Middle-East 6.5% 4.2% 98 9 
Kuwait KWT Middle-East 6.0% 3.5% 102 4 
Iraq IRQ Middle-East 5.7% 3.7% 150 35 
Qatar QAT Middle-East 3.8% 2.2% 26 2 
Iran IRN Middle-East 3.6% 4.1% 158 78 
Oman OMN Middle-East 1.9% 1.1% 5 4 
Algeria DZA North Africa 2.6% 1.7% 12 39 
Libya LBY North Africa 0.5% 0.6% 48 6 
Nigeria NGA Sub-Saharan Africa 4.9% 2.7% 37 177 
Angola AGO Sub-Saharan Africa 3.6% 1.9% 13 24 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6% 0.3% 1 1 
Republic of Congo COG Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6% 0.3% 2 5 
Gabon GAB Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5% 0.3% 2 2 
Sudan* SDN Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3% 0.2% 5 51 
Chad TCD Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2% 0.1% 2 14 
Russia RUS Other: CIS 17.4% 12.2% 103 143 
Kazakhstan KAZ Other: CIS 3.3% 1.9% 30 17 
Azerbaijan AZE Other: CIS 1.7% 1.0% 7 10 
Turkmenistan** TKM Other: CIS 0.2% 0.3% 1 5 
Brunei** BRN Other: Asia 0.3% 0.1% 1 0.4 
Venezuela VEN Other: Americas 4.3% 3.1% 298 31 
Canada CAN Other: Americas 4.4% 4.8% 173 36 
Mexico MEX Other: Americas 1.9% 3.1% 11 125 
Colombia** COL Other: Americas 1.6% 1.1% 2 48 
Ecuador** ECU Other: Americas 0.7% 0.6% 8 16 
Trinidad & Tobago** TTO Other: Americas 0.2% 0.1% 1 1 
Norway NOR Other: Europe 3.8% 2.1% 7 5 
*: includes both Sudan and South Sudan 
**: not included in the following graphs for the sake of clarity 
Source: Oil production and consumption: BP Statistical Report (2015), Enerdata (2016); population: UN 
(2015a) 
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Figure 3. Map of oil exporting countries (2014) 
 
 
The following 5 countries are not considered in the rest of the report: Turkmenistan, 
Brunei, Colombia, Ecuador and Trinidad & Tobago. This is justified by their relatively 
small production volumes, the relatively small size of their economies and population, as 
well as their limited potential to provoke regional socio-economic instability, potentially 
affecting to the EU.  
 
The analysis on the risks for oil exporters considers Norway (NOR) as the reference 
country since it has the highest income per capita6, the highest Human Development 
Index and, with Canada, the highest political stability of all oil exporters, as shown in 
Figure 4, which plots the Political Stability Index7 (WB (2016)) of oil exporters as a 
function of their Human Development Index8 (HDI, see UNDP (2015)). The size of the 
bubbles is a measure of the population. 
                                               
6 GDP per capita being calculate from IMF (2015) for income and UN (2015) for population. 
7 The political stability indicator is defined by the World Bank as: "Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-
motivated violence, including terrorism" and is calculated using a range of variables and sources. 
It constitutes one of the six dimension used to establish the Worldwide Governance Indicators – 
see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc  
8 According to the UNDP: " The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of 
average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being 
knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized 
indices for each of the three dimensions" - see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi  
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Figure 4: Political Stability and Human Development Index for oil exporting countries (2014) 
 
Source: HDI is from UNDP (2015), political stability indicator is from World Bank (2016) 
 
Most Sub-Saharan producers present a low, or very low, political stability, with the 
exception of Gabon (GAB), a small producer with a small population. Nigeria (NGA), in 
particular, appears as a large (highest and fast growing population, with close to 180 M 
inhabitants in 2014) and a socio-economically fragile country.   
In addition, some important North African and Middle Eastern exporters also display a 
low political stability: Algeria (DZA), Iran (IRN), in addition to Iraq (IRQ) or Libya (LBY) 
currently undergoing violent conflicts. Other important exporters, like Saudi Arabia 
(SAU) and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries9 are perceived to have a 
higher stability. 
Norway (NOR) and Canada (CAN) appear very stable, while other non-OECD exporters 
present a contrasted situation, with Mexico (MEX), Russia (RUS) and other CIS10 
countries scoring in-between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.2 Historical analysis of the exposure to the global oil market 
This section identifies the exporting countries listed in Table 1 that are most vulnerable 
to economic and social upheaval due to a long period of low oil prices11.  
                                               
9 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) gathers the following countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
10 CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Republics except Baltic States) 
11 Throughout this study the focus is on oil; in particular the role of natural gas has not been 
considered here. 
World average HDI  
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Figure 5 describes the oil price evolution since 1980 up to 2015. The following analysis 
focuses on 1990-2014 for reasons of data availability: GDP (WB, 2016) and oil 
production (BP, 2015) are only available by 2014. An extension to 2015 would certainly 
yield interesting results given the price trajectory in 2014/2015. 
Figure 5. Historical yearly oil price 1980-2015 
 
Source: BP (2015), EIA
12
  
 
To understand the role of oil in the economy and political stability the analysis below 
shows: 
1. Size of oil exports13 (2014):  
 compared to the GDP (Figure 7), which gives an overview of the exposure of the 
entire economy to the market;  
 compared to the Government Revenue (Figure 9), used as a proxy to evaluate 
the potential importance of the oil sector for the State budget, even though it 
does not show explicitly the direct government revenue from the oil sector14; 
2. Oil price sensitivity (1990-2014):  
 of the GDP per capita (Figure 8)  
 of the Government Revenue per capita (Figure 10). 
 
At world level, the relation between GDP and oil price goes both ways:  
 the evolution of economic activity (GDP) leads to changes in oil consumption that 
affect the oil price depending on the oil supply ability to adjust to demand (see 
for example Ghalayini, 2011); 
 the evolution of the oil price can also affect world GDP growth, especially 
negatively when the oil price increases (Jiménez-Rodríguez, 2005). 
                                               
12 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
13 Oil exports are estimated by multiplying the yearly exports in volume (Mbl/d) by the yearly oil 
price ($/bl) 
14 Government revenues from oil can be collected directly (e.g. National Oil Companies) or 
indirectly (e.g. royalties, profit-sharing agreements with International Oil Companies, export 
taxes).  
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However, at the level of oil exporting countries the relation is, to a large extent, one-way 
given their relative small share of world oil demand as well as of world GDP (respectively 
around 20% and 10% during 1990-2014 – see Annex 1): oil exports generate revenues 
that translate into economic activity (GDP) and income for the State (Berument et al., 
2010, IMF, 2014).  
 
2.2.1 Role of oil and gas in the Value Added structure 
Figure 6 shows the importance of the oil (crude oil and oil products) and gas sectors in 
the exporters' economy in 2011 – all related directly or indirectly to the oil price. All 
producers in the Middle-East and North Africa show Value Added shares above 30% (up 
to 60% for Oman and Kuwait), except United Araba Emirates (20%). Sub-Saharan 
countries are between 20% (Nigeria) and 30% (Angola).   
Figure 6. Share of VA related to fossil fuels (2011) 
 
Note: TCD: Chad, COG: Republic of Congo, GAB: Gabon, GNQ: Equatorial Guinea.  
Source: GTAP 9 (Narayanan et al. 2015).  
 
2.2.2 Exposure of the economy to the oil market 
Figure 7 shows the ratio between oil exports and GDP (Y-axis) along the proven 
reserves15 per capita (X-axis), which gives the perspective of the country with regards to 
the role of oil in the economy in a foreseeable future, which connects to the long-term 
political stability of the country. The bubble size is proportional to the population, which 
indicates the country's relative importance (including for regional and global stability if 
the country's situation deteriorates). The analysis is based on 2014 information. 
                                               
15 These are current proven reserves, not estimated resources – the latter refers to a longer term 
perspective, is (even) more uncertain, and would actually not change much the positioning of 
countries (using BGR 2014 energy resources estimate). 
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Figure 7. Exposure of economy: oil exports vs. GDP (2014) 
 
Note: The dotted lines are centred on Norway (NOR). Oil exports are calculated as the product of oil exports 
in volume [production – consumption] by the oil price (Brent, in current $) and divided by GDP (in current $ 
MER).  
Source: oil reserves and production are from BP (2015), oil consumption is from Enerdata (2016), GDP is 
from World Bank (2015) and population is from UN (2015a). 
Kuwait (KWT) is not shown because it has very high reserves per capita (27 kbl, oil exports ~ 60% GDP). 
 
Four groups of countries are identified from Figure 7 (relative to Norway (NOR)): 
 Upper left: high exposure of the economy and limited reserves per capita. This is 
especially true for Congo (COG) and Chad (TCD), two small countries, but also for 
Algeria (DZA) and Angola (AGO), two larger countries. Gabon (GAB) and 
Equatorial Guinea (GNQ), two very small countries, appear also fairly exposed 
with only slightly higher reserves per capita. Russia (RUS) and Nigeria (NGA) 
both present a slightly higher economic exposition than Norway (NOR), with 
smaller reserves per capita.  
 Upper right: high exposure of the economy but high reserves that can act as a 
long-term buffer for the economy. This group gathers most of the Middle-East 
exporters. Oil exports are in particular very high compared to GDP for Iraq (IRQ) 
and Saudi Arabia (SAU), even though their high reserves per capita may give 
some longer-term resilience to oil price changes. The conflict in Libya (LBY), a 
country with very high reserves per capita that shows in this category, is to a 
very large extent independent from the oil market16.  
                                               
16 The current situation of Libya follows an external action: the repression of social unrest in 2010-
2011 triggered a civil conflict followed by a NATO military intervention that ended the country's 
ruling system in 2011. Since then the country is torn by a conflict between various factions. 
KWT  
(27;60%) 
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 Lower left: limited reserves but limited exposure of the economy. This group 
actually gathers only Mexico (MEX) and Sudan (SDN), two large countries where 
oil exports are small, making their economy fairly independent from the oil 
market. 
 Lower right: high reserves, low exposure of the economy. This is the group with 
the expected highest economic stability with respect to oil price: small oil exports 
compared to GDP and high reserves per capita: Norway (NOR), Canada (CAN), 
and to a lesser extent Iran (IRN). Venezuela (VEN)17 also appears in this more 
"favourable" group with respect to exposure and resource availability, although 
this country is now facing a severe economic crisis – it underlines the fact that, 
whatever the specific exposure to a the oil market, national political and 
economic decisions are ultimately what shapes countries' stability. 
 
Figure 8 gives the elasticity of GDP per capita to the oil price over 1990-2014 as a 
function of the importance of oil exports compared to GDP (in 2014).  
The elasticity tends to increase with the importance of oil exports compared to GDP: 
 The reactivity of GDP per capita to oil price appears high (above the average over 
all exporters of 0.55) for five Sub-Saharan African exporters, North Africa 
exporters and three Middle-East countries including Iraq (IRQ) and Iran (IRN). 
Some of them show a very high value, close to 1: Congo (COG), Angola (AGO), 
Chad (TCD) and Iraq (IRQ). 
 The other Gulf Cooperation Council exporters (0.4-0.5), Nigeria (NGA, 0.4) and 
Sudan (SDN, 0.3) display a lower reactivity of GDP to oil price, in the order of 
magnitude of other exporters like Canada (CAN), Norway (NOR) and Venezuela 
(VEN) (all below 0.4).  
 The low elasticity of United Arab Emirates (ARE) may be explained by a more 
diversified economy, with Dubai developing its services sector beyond the oil and 
gas industry (see Figure 6 above and IMF 2014). 
 The low elasticity of Mexico may be explained by the very small value of oil 
exports compared to GDP. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
However the role of oil cannot be completely discarded since the anterior political stability of the 
country was partly imposed through repression financed by oil revenues rather than the result of a 
peaceful consent of the population. The argument may also apply to other oil producing countries.  
17 It should be noted that Venezuela's reserves include non-conventional oil, which is costlier to 
produce than conventional oil and more difficult to transform into export; considering only 
conventional reserves, Venezuela would get closer to the Iran (IRN), with reserves per capita of 
2.5 kbl (instead of the 9.7 kbl shown here). 
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Figure 8. Elasticity of GDP per capita to oil price (1990-2014
18, 19
) 
 
Note: Elasticities correspond to the estimated values of 𝛽 in the regression: 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡
) =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗
𝑙𝑛(𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡) + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡. GDP per capita and oil price are expressed in current $. The regression 
gives R
2
 within [84% - 99%], except for LBY (68%) – details are provided in Annex 2. 
Source: oil price is from BP (2015), oil exports are from BP (2015) and Enerdata (2016), GDP from World 
Bank (2016) and population from UN (2015a). 
 
2.2.3 Exposure of Government revenue to the oil market 
This section analyses the impact of oil market on the Government revenue, which can be 
considered as a better indicator than GDP in terms of short-term political stability since it 
connects to the capacity of the State to deliver basic public needs like health, 
infrastructure or security.   
Figure 9 shows the ratio between oil exports and Government revenues (y-axis) along 
the proven reserves15 per capita (X-axis), which gives the perspective of the country 
with regards to the role of oil in the long term. The size of the bubble is proportional to 
the population, which indicates the country's relative importance (including for cross-
border impacts if the country's stability deteriorates). The analysis is based on 2014 
information. 
                                               
18 Except for Angola (AGO, 1996-2014), Azerbaijan (AZE, 1994-2014), Chad (TCD, 2003-2014), 
Equatorial Guinea (GNQ, 1992-2014), Iraq (IRQ, 2004-2014), Kazakhstan (KAZ, 1994-2014), 
Kuwait (KWT, 1993-2014), Libya (LBY, 1990-2010), Mexico (MEX, 1995-2014), Nigeria (NGA, 
2000-2014), Russia (RUS, 1998-2014), Sudan (SDN, 1999-2010). 
19 Corrected periods are due to status as oil exporter (AGO, TCD, GNQ), missing economic data 
(AZE, KAZ, NGA, RUS), violent conflicts (IRQ, KWT, LBY, SDN) or economic crisis (MEX). 
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Figure 9. Exposure of State:  oil exports vs. State budget (2014) 
 
Note: The dotted lines are centred on Norway (NOR). Oil exports are calculated as the product of oil exports 
in volume [production – consumption] by the oil price (Brent, in current $) and divided by the Government 
revenue (in current $ MER).  
Source: oil reserves and production are from BP Statistical Report 2015, oil consumption is from Enerdata 
(2016), Government revenue is from IMF (2015) and population is from UN (2015a).Kuwait (KWT) is not 
shown because it has very high reserves per capita (27 kbl, oil exports ~ 70% government revenue). 
 
Figure 9 presents similarities with Figure 7: the relative positioning of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries and North African exporters; but also striking differences: 
in particular the positioning Nigeria (NGA) and Iran (IRN) where resources for the 
Government appear potentially much more exposed to the oil market than when looking 
only at GDP. 
Compared to Norway (NOR), we can describe the following four groups: 
 Upper left: high exposure of the State and limited reserves per capita. All Sub-
Saharan African countries fall into this category, in particular Nigeria (NGA), the 
largest of all exporters, where oil exports are larger than the Government 
revenues. To a lesser extent oil exports appear relatively high for Algeria (DZA) 
and Russia (RUS) comparatively to their Government revenue. 
 Upper right: high exposure of the State but large reserves per capita. All Middle 
East exporters fall in this category, where the economy depends on oil but that 
have large reserves per capita which might act as a long term stabiliser if 
properly used. 
 Lower left: low reserves but low exposure. In this category we find only Mexico 
(MEX), which is little exposed but which should not rely upon future oil production 
to finance its State budget. 
KWT  
(27; 70%) 
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 Lower right: high reserves, low exposure of the State. 
Canada (CAN) appears as the least exposed to political instability because of oil 
price changes, due to both oil exports being as small as 20% of government 
revenue and to high reserves per capita.   
In addition to this 2014 snapshot, Figure 10 gives the elasticity of government revenue 
per capita to the oil price over 1990-2014 as a function of the importance of oil exports 
compared to government revenue: as with GDP, the elasticity tends to increase with the 
size of oil exports.  
Figure 10. Elasticity of Government Revenue per capita to oil price (1990-201420
, 21
) 
 
Note: Elasticities correspond to the estimated values of 𝛽 in the regression: 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐺𝑣𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡
) =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗
𝑙𝑛(𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡) + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡. Government revenue per capita and oil price are expressed in current $. 
The regression gives R2 within [85% - 99%], except for ARE (45%) – details are provided in Annex 2 
Source: oil price: BP (2015),oil exports: BP (2015) and Enerdata (2016), Government revenue: IMF (2015), 
population:  UN (2015a). 
 
 Most Sub-Saharan Africa exporters, North Africa exporters and large Middle-East 
countries show a very high elasticity, close to 1 or above: this confirms the very 
high dependency of their State budget to oil price. As an illustration, Angola 
(AGO, with an elasticity of government revenue above 1)) has sent on April 6th 
                                               
20 Except for Angola (AGO, 1996-2014), Azerbaijan (AZE, 1994-2014), Chad (TCD, 2003-2014), 
Equatorial Guinea (GNQ, 1992-2014), Iraq (IRQ, 2004-2014), Kazakhstan (KAZ, 1994-2014), 
Kuwait (KWT, 1993-2014), Libya (LBY, 1990-2010), Mexico (MEX, 1995-2014), Nigeria (NGA, 
2000-2014), Russia (RUS, 1998-2014), Sudan (SDN, 1999-2010). 
21 Corrected periods are due to status as oil exporter (AGO, TCD, GNQ), missing economic data 
(AZE, KAZ, NGA, RUS), violent conflicts (IRQ, KWT, LBY, SDN) or economic crisis (MEX). 
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201622 a formal letter to the IMF for support to deal with the impact of low oil 
price on the fiscal revenues of the State. 
 Smaller Gulf Cooperation Council exporters and Gabon (GAB) show a lower ratio 
(around 0.6), which remains higher than for other exporters (0.2 to 0.4). 
 As with GDP, the singular behaviour of United Arab Emirates (ARE) may be 
explained by its diversification towards a service economy, which helps proving 
alternative revenues to its Government - see Figure 6 on the share of oil-related 
sectors in the economy and IMF (2014) for a discussion on Dubai and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
 
2.2.4 Oil-related Sovereign Wealth Funds 
To complete the analysis on the capacity of States to cope with a low oil price, Table 2 
gives the oil-related Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) set up by the countries that may be 
used as a buffer capacity with a quicker response time than putting into production oil 
reserves23: 
 Sub-Saharan African oil exporters show no SWF (Congo, Gabon, Sudan, Chad) or 
low values of their fund (Nigeria, Angola); 
 North African oil exporters have more substantial funds, with Algeria at 23% of 
total GDP (70% of Government revenues) and Libya at 160% of GDP;  
 All Middle East exporters have SWF: while Iraq is very low and Oman and Iran 
have limited funds with respect to GDP (still 100% of Government revenues in 
the case of Iran), other exporters have important funds ranging from 85% of GDP 
for Saudi Arabia (twice the size of the Government revenues) to more than 300% 
of GDP (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates). In the current context, Saudi Arabia24 
actually announced in April 2016 its intention to expand its second largest 
sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), to nearly 2 tn$ by 2030 
(which would add up to a total of 2.5 tn$ if the other funds remain at the same 
level as of today). 
                                               
22 Statement by IMF Deputy Managing Director Min Zhu on Angola (April 6 2016), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr16155.htm  Last access 08/04/2016 
23 The use of the capital of these funds can be subject to heated political debates, like in the case 
of Norway and its GPF. 
24 The expansion of the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund would include the partial privatization 
of the national oil company Aramco, as part of its Saudi Vision 2030: 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6  
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Table 2. Oil-related Sovereign Wealth Funds (2014) 
Country ISO3 
code 
Region Value  
(bn$) 
per capita 
(k$) 
% GDP % Gvt 
revenue 
United Arab Emirates ARE Middle-East 1214 134 304% 805% 
Saudi Arabia SAU Middle-East 792 26 106% 284% 
Kuwait KWT Middle-East 592 158 362% 527% 
Qatar QAT Middle-East 256 118 122% 257% 
Iran IRN Middle-East 62 1 15% 100% 
Oman OMN Middle-East 40 9 49% 103% 
Iraq IRQ Middle-East 1 0 0% 1% 
Libya LBY North Africa 66 11 160% 392% 
Algeria DZA North Africa 50 1 23% 70% 
Angola AGO Sub-Saharan Africa 5 0 4% 10% 
Nigeria NGA Sub-Saharan Africa 1 0 0% 2% 
Russia RUS Other: CIS 139 1 7% 20% 
Kazakhstan KAZ Other: CIS 79 5 36% 149% 
Azerbaijan AZE Other: CIS 37 4 50% 128% 
Canada CAN Other: Americas 18 0 1% 3% 
Mexico MEX Other: Americas 6 0 0% 2% 
Venezuela VEN Other: Americas 1 0 0% 1% 
Norway NOR Other: Europe 848 165 170% 316% 
Note: oil exporters without any SWF are not shown in the table: Republic of Congo, Gabon, Sudan, Chad. 
Source: Oil-related SWFs from Wikipedia
25
, population from UN (2015a), GDP from World Bank (2016), 
Government revenue from IMF (2015). SWFs taken into account: ARE (ADIA, ICD, ADIC, IPIC, MDC, EIA, RIA); 
SAU (SAMA, PIF); KWT (KIA); QAT (QIA); IRN (NDF); OMN (OIF); IRQ (DFI); LBY (LIA); DZA (RRF); AGO 
(FSDEA); NGA (BDIC, NSIA); RUS (RNWF, RRF, RDIF); KAZ (S-K JSC, KNF, NIC); AZE (SOFAZ); CAN (AHSTF); 
MEX (ORSFM, FMP); VEN (FEM); NOR (GPF) 
 
2.3 Political stability and the oil market 
To summarize the results by comparing the exposure to oil market with the political 
stability analysis (see Figure 4):  
 Sub-Saharan Africa 
o Nigeria is a large, unstable and highly exposed exporter, with a small 
SWF: it appears like the most vulnerable to a lasting low oil price;  
o Sudan26  does not look that exposed but is highly unstable (due to recent 
conflicts): a lasting low oil price could worsen the situation by further 
limiting the State capacity to provide basic services;  
o other sub-Saharan countries appear also highly exposed, and without any 
back-up in the form of SWF, even if less unstable; of these, Angola is the 
largest in terms of population (and, as mentioned above, has already 
requested support from IMF – see Footnote 22). 
                                               
25 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_wealth_fund  
26 In this analysis we considered Sudan and South Sudan together 
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 North Africa   
o Algeria, a fairly large country with 40 million inhabitants, is very sensitive 
to oil price changes, has low reserves per capita, a limited SWF and a low 
political stability index: it appears vulnerable to a lasting period of low oil 
price, especially in the current situation of rising extremism in the region 
and conflicts at its eastern border (Libya) as well as on the South (Niger, 
Mali);   
o Libya is already undergoing a conflict: a long period of relatively low oil 
price could either worsen the situation by cutting the remaining capacity to 
provide basic services to the population, or conversely reduce the factions' 
capacity to finance the war. 
 Middle-East  
o The geopolitical situation in this region is already very difficult, with 
sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen; 
o most exporting countries of the region are highly sensitive to the oil price, 
which makes then vulnerable to abrupt changes in the oil market, even if 
their high reserves and important SWF can help maintaining some political 
stability by allowing them to get access to financial resources before the 
oil price gets higher; in addition Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and 
especially Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, are showing willingness 
to diversify fiscal revenues by reforming their domestic energy prices and 
cutting energy-related subsidies27 so as to make them more resilient, and 
improve energy efficiency indicators;  
o United Arab Emirates looks the least vulnerable of all: it is much less 
sensitive to oil price28, thanks to economic and fiscal diversification, have 
the highest SWF (in total value as well as relative to population, GDP and 
Government revenues) and displays a relatively high political stability. 
 Others 
o Former CIS producers have also a high sensitivity to oil price (comparable 
to sub-Saharan African countries), even they benefit from relatively large 
SWF, and relatively low political stability (comparable to large Middle-East 
countries) – this should be taken into consideration given their role as oil 
and gas transit countries and their proximity to Middle-East and Turkey; 
o European and North America producers do not look exposed to lasting low 
oil price even if their upstream sector will be affected; they may actually 
benefit from cheaper energy (see Vrontisi et al. 2015 for an analysis of the 
EU). 
 
 
                                               
27 Oil & Gas Journal, 01/11/2016,  http://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/01/saudi-arabia-uae-lead-
gcc-subsidy-reform.html 
28 The country could be indirectly affected by a lasting low oil price through its financial exposure 
to other oil exporting countries.  
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3 Macroeconomic impacts on oil exporters 
 
3.1 Scenario definition 
This section presents the two scenarios analysed in Section 3.2. The type of analysis 
presented here is based on a comparative statics approach, which means that a scenario 
is compared to a Baseline for a given year (2015), and that it is not a projection or 
forecasting. A low oil price scenario has been developed, which is ceteris paribus in 
nature i.e. the change in oil price is the only difference between the scenario and the 
Baseline, while ignoring other likely shocks or events. 
"Baseline": The "business-as-usual" development. Oil prices remain around US$ 100 
per barrel in 2015.  
"60% Scenario": This is the central scenario and assumes an oil price of US$ 40 per 
barrel in 2015, which is 60% lower as compared to the baseline in dollar terms.  
The macro-economic effects of the low oil price scenarios are analysed using the global 
GEM-E3 model (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1: GEM-E3 model 
The macro-economic impacts of the oil price scenarios are analysed with the GEM-E3 
model (www.gem-e3.net). It is a multi-region computable general equilibrium model 
that covers the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the 
environment. GEM-E3 covers the entire economy and can be used to evaluate 
consistently the distributional effects of policies on the national accounts, investment, 
consumption, public finance, foreign trade and employment for the various economic 
sectors and agents across the countries. The model includes all 28 Member States of the 
European Union and all major non-European countries.  The whole economy is 
represented in 21 economic sectors. The countries are linked through endogenous 
bilateral trade. The GEM-E3 results are of comparative static nature, and reflect the 
annual impact of imposing the lower oil price during a full year with the economy fully 
adapting to the new situation. In other words, the lagged impacts of oil price changes 
are observed to be spread over a couple of years, whereas in the GEM-E3 model they 
are assumed to happen immediately in the same year. Further, this methodology also 
assumes that the EU economy is in equilibrium. The model is calibrated using the GTAP 
829 database. The GEM-E3 model has been used to analyse the macro- economic effects 
of the climate, energy and air quality policies to support DG CLIMA, DG ENER, and DG 
ENV (e.g. SWD(2015) 17, SWD(2014) 15, SWD(2013)531, SWD(2013) 132). Ciscar et 
al. (2004) and Maisonnave et al. (2012) use earlier versions of the GEM-E3 model to 
simulate the impact of high oil prices (the latter focussing on the cross-relation with 
climate policies). Kitous et al. (2013) analyse a number of scenarios of the 2012 Iran 
crisis and the boycott imposed by the Western world.  
 
                                               
29 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
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3.2 Modelling results: the role of oil in oil producer countries 
This section presents the macro-economic impact of the 60% Scenario with the GEM-E3 
model. Both consumption and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are presented as a 
percentage difference from the Baseline. The global consumption and GDP increases in 
the world are around 1%. As expected, the economic impact on oil importing countries is 
positive, while oil exporting countries are negatively affected by lower oil prices. 
Figure 11: The impact of the low oil price on consumption vs export dependence 
 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
Table 3: Impact of a 60% oil price drop on private consumption 
Consumption         
% change with Baseline, 2015         
     World 0.96 
 
Mexico  (MEX) -7.33 
European Union (EU28) 1.52 
 
Argentina 0.95 
USA   1.65 
 
North Africa (NOAF) -2.14 
Russia  (RUS) -3.97 
 
New Zealand   1.82 
Canada  (CAN) 1.30 
 
Saudi Arabia  (SAU) -12.81 
Japan   1.36 
 
Iran  (IRN) -3.68 
Australia  1.33 
 
South Africa (ZAF)   2.02 
China  (CHN) 1.85 
 
Rest of Middle East (MIEA) -6.32 
India  (IND) 2.59 
 
Sub-Sahara Africa (SSAF) -7.25 
Indonesia   2.88 
 
Rest of Central and S. America 0.87 
Brazil  2.05 
 
Central Asia and Caucasus -5.88 
Republic of Korea   2.61 
 
South-East Asia 2.58 
Rest of Europe and Turkey 0.57   Rest of Asia and Pacific 3.02 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
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Figure 12: The impact of the low oil price on GDP vs export dependence 
 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
 
Table 4: Impact of a 60% oil price drop on real GDP 
Value of GDP         
% change with Baseline, 2015         
     World 1.11 
 
Mexico  (MEX) -3.92 
European Union (EU28) 1.92 
 
Argentina 1.16 
USA   1.79 
 
North Africa (NOAF) -2.79 
Russia  (RUS) -4.43 
 
New Zealand   2.42 
Canada  (CAN) 1.67 
 
Saudi Arabia  (SAU) -14.34 
Japan   1.56 
 
Iran  (IRN) -5.21 
Australia  1.60 
 
South Africa   2.45 
China  (CHN) 1.73 
 
Rest of Middle East (MIEA) -8.58 
India  (IND) 3.21 
 
Sub-Sahara Africa (SSAF) -8.56 
Indonesia   3.24 
 
Rest of Central and S. America 0.90 
Brazil  2.65 
 
Central Asia and Caucasus -15.20 
Republic of Korea   3.25 
 
South-East Asia 2.95 
Rest of Europe and Turkey 0.48   Rest of Asia and Pacific 3.32 
Source: JRC, GEM-E3 model 
 
Table 3 shows that an oil price drop leads to different impacts across countries30. 
Consumption decline in oil exporting countries would range from 2.1% to 12.8%. The fall 
                                               
30 The analysis does not take into account the possible use of SWFs. The analysis only looks at the 
low oil prices and its impacts in 2015, and not beyond.  
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in the price of oil results in a steep decline in consumption in Middle East countries, 
particularly Saudi Arabia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a 60% reduction in the price of oil 
would lead consumption to fall by 7.25%. Given that Sub-Saharan Africa is analysed as a 
whole, the impact on oil exporting countries is expected to be even higher. The effect on 
North African countries is lower than that on the rest of oil exporting countries (a 2.1% 
contraction) due to their relatively low consumption level and their economic structure 
not excessively depending on oil exports. In general terms, consumption impact 
differences could be partly explained by the lower/higher economic dependence on oil. 
Figure 11 shows the relation between consumption variations and oil exports. According 
to the results, the effect of oil prices on consumption is strongly correlated with export 
dependence. Thereby, countries where the share of oil in total exports is very high are 
more vulnerable to lower oil prices, as expected. 
 
Similarly, Figure 12 shows that the sharp decline in oil prices affects the GDP of oil 
exporting countries in a heterogeneous manner. A 60% reduction in the price of oil 
results in a 15.2% decline of the GDP in Central Asia and Caucasus, while the GDP of 
North Africa would decline by 2.8%. The GDP of Middle East and Sub-Saharan African 
countries would decline by around 8.5%. The impact of the low oil price on GDP is 
strongly correlated with import dependence (Figure 12). For instance, Saudi Arabia 
where crude oil exports represent 35% of the GDP, a 60% fall in the price of oil leads 
GDP to decline by 14.3%. On the other hand, Mexican crude oil exports represent 3.4% 
of the GDP and therefore, the decline of the GDP would be much lower (3.9%). 
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4 Migration from oil exporting countries  
 
An economic or political instability induced by low oil export prices is not assumed to be 
the only exploratory factor driving migrations, but may be an important driver in certain 
cases. This section tries to give first insights on the migratory patterns that might follow 
economic or political turmoil in oil-exporting countries.  
Figure 13: Foreign residents originating from oil-exporting countries (mid-2015) 
 
Note: The figures are the foreign residents and do not picture migration flows in a certain time period. They 
do not (fully) account for 2nd-or more generation immigrants which (also) hold the nationality of the 
destination country. 
Source: UN (2015b).  
 
Figure 13 shows the destination of the residents from oil-exporting countries living 
abroad. A first observation is that a large share of emigrants settles in neighbouring 
countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle-East (most of the emigrants from 
North Africa reside in Europe). The oil-exporting countries with the highest presence in 
EU28 are Iran, Iraq, Angola, Nigeria and Algeria, which has most residents in Europe, 
both in relative and absolute terms.  
Out of 54 million migrants living in EU, 20 million is the internal migration between EU 
countries. People from the 14 oil-exporting states discussed in this section constitute 
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only 10% of the non-EU migration. Figure 1431 shows that historical and cultural bonds 
between EU Member states and countries of origin matter. Portugal has a large 
community from Angola; most Nigerians settled in the UK; and France has a large 
Algerian community. This may be a proxy as to which EU Member State would receive 
most of the immigration if emigration picks up in one of the oil-exporting countries.  
Figure 14: Origin of foreign residents in the EU28 (mid 2015) 
 
Source: UN (2015b).  
 
Finally, Table 5 shows that on average around one third of the total migrants from oil 
exporting countries reside in EU28. The countries with the highest relative presence in 
EU28 are Algeria, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Iraq. The high 
presence of the last two countries is likely linked to the internal armed conflicts they are 
undergoing. Nigeria has a surprisingly low presence in EU28, given the size of its 
population - however, any economic and political instability may bring significant 
numbers of people on the move. 
                                               
31 With 12 million, Germany has the largest number of foreign residents. However, this figure 
includes more than 3 million people from Russia, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet republics, 
many of which are 'ethnic Germans'.  
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Table 5: Total population and its foreign residents of oil-exporting countries 
 Share 
abroad 
Share 
in EU 
Total pop. 
(million) 
 Share 
abroad 
Share 
in EU 
Total pop. 
(million) 
Algeria 4.4% 4.0% 39.9 GCC* 2.0% 0.3% 21.2 
Angola 2.5% 0.9% 22.1 Iraq 4.3% 1.3% 34.3 
Azerbaijan 11.8% 0.4% 9.7 Iran 1.4% 0.5% 78.5 
Chad 1.6% 0.1% 13.2 Libya 2.2% 1.1% 6.3 
Rep. Congo 4.8% 2.1% 4.6 Nigeria 0.6% 0.2% 178.5 
Eq. Guinea 10.1% 2.5% 0.8 Saudi Arabia 0.9% 0.2% 29.4 
Gabon 3.7% 1.3% 1.7 South Sudan 5.6% 0.0% 11.4 
Note: GCC oil exporting countries excluding Iraq and Saudi Arabia: Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates.  
Source: UN (2015b). 
 
 
  
  
 
28 
5 Conclusions and Caveats 
 
Between June 2014 and March 2016, the monthly average price of Brent crude oil fell 
around 65%. Although there is no consensus in the literature on the fundamentals of this 
oil price fall most studies find that the oil price decline was driven by a combination of 
several factors: (i) the unexpected increase in oil production due to the surge in US 
shale oil production and the increase of Saudi Arabia production, (ii) as well as the 
weaker than expected economic growth in Europe and Asia, (iii) that both materialized 
into increasing stocks, and (iv) the appreciation of the US dollar which made crude oil 
more expensive for the rest of the world.    
Given the importance of oil revenues for several oil exporting countries, this report 
analyses the effects of oil price on their economy. Firstly, descriptive statistics are 
employed to show the exposure of the main oil exporting countries to the oil market, 
where GDP and Government revenue is found to be closely correlated to the oil price. In 
general, several Sub-Saharan African and North African countries show high exposure of 
the economy to the oil market. Combined with limited Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
reserves per capita, this high dependency of Government budget to oil price make these 
countries very vulnerable. 
Secondly, the macro-economic effects of a fall in the price of oil is analysed with the 
GEM-E3 model. Two scenarios are compared: (i) a "Baseline" scenario in which the price 
of oil is US$ 100 per barrel and (ii) "60% scenario" in which the price of oil is US$ 40 per 
barrel. The results show that an oil price drop has different effects on oil exporting 
countries, and is strongly correlated with import dependence. Thus, countries where the 
share of oil in total exports is very high are more vulnerable to lower oil prices. A 60% 
fall in the price of oil could lead the GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa to decline by around 
8.5%. 
The economic analysis is in comparative static terms, i.e. compared to a Baseline and 
the results are not projections. The low oil price scenario is ceteris paribus in nature, i.e. 
the change in oil price is the only difference between the scenario and the Baseline. 
Indeed, the analysis does not take into account any policy reactions that may happen 
because of this major price shift. Crude oil producers (de facto Saudi Arabia, the 
historical swing producer) may decide to tighten the oil supply in order to bring the price 
to higher levels. Other governments may decide to increase or decrease public spending, 
or their tax rates. Another caveat is that the methodology does not allow for the 
appreciation or depreciation of currencies, changes in inflation or interest rate decisions 
by the central banks. 
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List of abbreviations and definitions 
 
Countries and regions 
AGO Angola KWT Kuwait 
ARE United Arab Emirates LBY Libya 
AZE Azerbaijan MEX Mexico 
BRN Brunei MIEA Middle East 
CAN Canada NGA Nigeria 
CHN China NOAF North Africa 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States NOR Norway 
COG Republic of Congo OMN Oman 
COL Colombia QAT Qatar 
DZA Algeria RUS Russia 
ECU Ecuador SAU Saudi Arabia 
EU28 European Union (28) SDN Sudan 
GAB Gabon SSAF Sub-Saharan Africa 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council TCD Chad 
GNQ Equatorial Guinea TKM Turkmenistan 
IND India TTO Trinidad & Tobago 
IRN Iran USA USA 
IRQ Iraq VEN Venezuela 
KAZ Kazakhstan ZAF South Africa 
 
 
Units 
bl:  barrel of oil 
Gbl:  giga barrels of oil, 1 000 000 000 bl 
kbl:  kilo barrels of oil, 1 000 bl 
 
bn$:  billion US$,  1 000 000 000 $ 
k$:  kilo US$,  1 000 $ 
tn$:  trillion US$,  1 000 000 000 000 $ 
 
M:  million 
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Annex 1. Share of net oil exporters in oil consumption and GDP 
 
Figure 15 gives the share of the oil exporting countries considered in this report (see 
Table 1) in the World oil consumption and GDP. 
 
Figure 15. Share of oil producers in world oil consumption and GDP (1990-2014) 
 
Source: GDP from WB (2015) and oil consumption from BP (2015) and Enerdata (2106). 
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Annex 2. Regression of GDP and Government revenue to oil price 
 
Table 6 gives the regression coefficients from the elasticity calculation shown in Figure 8 
and Figure 10. 
 
Table 6. Regression of GDP and Government revenue (per capita) to oil price 
Country ISO3 
code 
Region GDP per capita vs. oil price Gvt Revenue per capita vs. 
oil price 
Elast. R2 Period Elast. R2 Period 
Saudi Arabia SAU Middle-East 0.5 97% 1990-2014 0.9 98% 1990-2014 
United Arab Emirates ARE Middle-East 0.2 84% 1990-2014 0.3 45% 1990-2014 
Kuwait KWT Middle-East 0.7 96% 1993-2014 0.6 96% 1993-2014 
Iraq IRQ Middle-East 0.8 98% 2004-2014 1.1 98% 2004-2014 
Qatar QAT Middle-East 0.4 99% 1990-2014 0.6 98% 1990-2014 
Iran IRN Middle-East 0.7 93% 1990-2014 0.8 91% 1990-2014 
Oman OMN Middle-East 0.5 98% 1990-2014 0.6 98% 1990-2014 
Algeria DZA North Africa 0.7 96% 1990-2014 0.9 99% 1990-2014 
Libya LBY North Africa 0.6 68% 1990-2010 1.0 94% 1990-2010 
Nigeria NGA Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 98% 2000-2014 0.8 85% 2000-2014 
Angola AGO Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 97% 1996-2014 1.4 99% 1996-2014 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ Sub-Saharan Africa 0.7 94% 1992-2014 1.1 92% 1992-2014 
Republic of Congo COG Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 97% 1990-2014 1.2 99% 1990-2014 
Gabon GAB Sub-Saharan Africa 0.7 93% 1990-2014 0.5 93% 1990-2014 
Sudan* SDN Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 99% 1999-2010 1.0 97% 1999-2010 
Chad TCD Sub-Saharan Africa 0.8 92% 2003-2014 1.4 96% 2003-2014 
Russia RUS Other: CIS 0.7 96% 1998-2014 0.8 96% 1998-2014 
Kazakhstan KAZ Other: CIS 0.8 95% 1994-2014 1.0 96% 1994-2014 
Azerbaijan AZE Other: CIS 0.7 96% 1994-2014 0.9 96% 1994-2014 
Venezuela VEN Other: Americas 0.3 91% 1990-2014 0.4 93% 1990-2014 
Canada CAN Other: Americas 0.4 99% 1990-2014 0.3 98% 1990-2014 
Mexico MEX Other: Americas 0.1 88% 1995-2014 0.2 95% 1995-2014 
Norway NOR Other: Europe 0.3 98% 1990-2014 0.3 98% 1990-2014 
Average exporters 0.5 98% 1990-2014 0.5 99% 1990-2014 
Note: trend-corrected linear regression analysis 
Source: oil price is from BP (2015), oil exports are from BP (2015) and Enerdata (2016), GDP from World 
Bank (2016), Government revenue from IMF (2015), and population from UN (2015a). 
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Annex 3. Country factsheets of selected countries 
 
This section presents the facts sheets for a total of 18 important oil producing countries 
in the vicinity of the EU. The country list includes 11 African countries, 4 Middle Eastern 
countries and 3 other countries. 
African countries 
Algeria 
Angola 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Republic of Congo 
Gabon 
Equatorial Guinea 
Libya 
Nigeria 
South Sudan 
Sudan  
 
Middle East 
Iran 
Iraq 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab Emirates 
 
Other countries 
Canada 
Norway 
Russia 
 
  
The country fact sheets represent general basic indicators, oil production figures, and 
trade statistics. The economic shock induced by low oil export prices is not assumed to 
be the only exploratory factor driving demographic migratory pressure, but may be a 
very important driver in certain cases. These facts are complemented with figures 
describing the size of its diaspora in neigbouring countries, Europe and the rest of the 
world, as well as their main countries of destination. The latter are a proxy to see which 
countries are likely to be affected first by migration inflow in case of political and 
economic instability. 
Data used in this chapter comes from different sources: World Trade Organisation, 
International Monetary Fund and United Nations. Presented economic forecasts are 
based on IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2015). The forecasts were made in the 
second half of 2015 and (amongst other things) assume that the oil price will stay on the 
low level until at least 2017. Also it has been assumed that nuclear agreement with Iran 
will lead to increase in production and export of Iranian oil in the future. 
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North African countries  
Algeria 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Algeria had produced in 2014 
1525 thousand bpd, which is 
significantly lower than in the 
peak of its production ten 
years ago (when production 
had reached almost 2000 
bpd). Oil (and other fuels) is 
almost only product the 
country exports. On the other 
hand, Algerian economy is not 
so much dependent on trade 
(like other African oil exporting 
countries).     
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Lower oil prices have had an 
important effect on the fiscal 
and current account balances. 
Government revenue declined 
in 10 percentage points of GDP 
from 2012 to 2015. The 
deterioration in the fiscal 
balance has wiped out 
government net savings.  
Current account balance has 
changed from 10% surplus in 
2011 to 17% deficit in 2015. 
GDP is expected to increase 
around 4% in 2016.    
 
 
 
Table 7: Algeria basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  39 929 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  214 063 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  551 596 
Current account balance (million US$, 2013)   869 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  3 478 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   65.1 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  62 956
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  58 330 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.33
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   0.5 
Fuels and mining products   97.6 
Manufactures   1.9 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 16: Algeria macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
According to UN data 32, the total number of migrants from Algeria amount to 1.7 m 
people, out of which 81% (1.4 m) live in one country – France33. Other European 
countries with Algerian diaspora are: Spain, UK and Germany. Number of Algerians living 
in other African countries is surprisingly small – little more than 40 thousand people 
(most of which lives in Algeria`s neighbours – Morocco and Tunisia). Other important 
countries of residence of Algerians are Canada and Israel.  
 
Figure 17: Total migrant stock for Algeria at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) (excl. France) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
33 Due to large share of migration to France in total migration from Algeria, France was not shown 
on the graph.  
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Libya 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Libya used to be one of the 
main producers of oil in 
Africa, but in the last few 
years production dropped 
drastically (from around 1820 
thousand bpd in 2007 to little 
less than 500 thousand bpd in 
2014). Almost all of this 
production is exported (and 
country export consists 
mainly of oil and gas).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Not only lower oil prices but 
also the civil war in 2011 has 
affected its economy in recent 
years. Both fiscal and current 
account balance are much 
deteriorated. Although the 
economy is expected to 
recover in the coming years, 
government savings are 
declining, and debt will 
sharply increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Libya basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  6 253 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  41 119 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  97 582 
Current account balance (million US$, 2013) -  108 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)  11 622 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   117.8 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  21 000
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  19 000 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.11
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   0.0 
Fuels and mining products   96.9 
Manufactures   3.1 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 18: Libya macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
Europe is the most important destination of migration from Libya – and Italy and United 
Kingdom are the two main countries where Libyans live. In Africa, Libyans live in other 
Maghreb countries and also in Egypt. There is also significant population living in Israel, 
USA and Canada.  
 
Figure 19: Total migrant stock for Libya at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Sub-Saharan African countries 
Angola 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Angola is one of the biggest 
African oil exporters and oil 
constitutes almost all of its 
export. In 2014 production of 
oil reached 1.7 million barrels 
per day, slightly lower than its 
peak in 2008. As domestic 
consumption of oil is still very 
low, the majority of extraction 
is exported. 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Current account balance in 
Angola has changed from 10% 
surplus in 2010-2012 to 7.5% 
deficit in 2015, with 
expectations to move toward 
balance in coming years. As oil 
revenues are an important 
source of income for 
government, the drop in oil 
prices has an impact on its 
budget (although revenues - in 
relation to GDP - had started to 
fall even before the oil price 
slump). Angola is expected also 
to see sharp decrease in 
investment to GDP ratio (from 
around 15% in 2010-2015) to 
little more than 10% in 2016-
2020 due to lower investments 
in its dominant economic 
sector oil. 
 
Table 9: Angola basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  22 137 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  131 401 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  175 103 
Current account balance (million US$, 2013)  8 348 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)  5 516 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   100.3 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  62 400
Merchandise imports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  28 320 
Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)    0.33 
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   0.0 
Fuels and mining products   97.1 
Manufactures   2.3 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 20: Angola macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
At mid-year of 2015, over half million (556 thousand) of Angolans lived abroad, out of 
which 317000 in Africa (mainly in Democratic Republic of Congo). Europe was second 
largest destination of migration, with the majority of population living in Portugal. Next 
major countries are: France, United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Outside 
Africa and Europe live relatively few Angolans – mainly in USA and Brazil. 
 
Figure 21: Total migrant stock for Angola at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Cameroon 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Although Cameroon is 
considered to be oil producing 
country, the extraction of oil is 
low compared to other 
countries. Almost all oil 
production is exported and the 
share of this commodity in 
total export exceeds 50%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Cameroon, which is a 
relatively minor oil producer, 
has been hardly affected by 
lower oil prices. Government 
revenue declined in 1 
percentage point of GDP from 
2014 to 2015. Permanent 
fiscal deficits are making 
government net debt to 
increase sharply. In the 
coming years, GDP is 
expected to grow by 5%. 
 
 
Table 10: Cameroon basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  22 819 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  32 549 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  67 660 
Current account balance (million US$, 2013) - 1 128 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)   734 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   57.8 
            
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  4 853 
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  6 982 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.03
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products  33.8 
Fuels and mining products   57.9 
Manufactures   8.3 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 22: Cameroon macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
The main destination of migration from Cameroon is Europe, where in the mid-year 2015 
lived almost 160 thousand people (and half of them in France). Other major host 
countries in Europe are: Germany, Belgium and Italy. In other African countries lived 
120 000 Cameroonians, mainly in Chad, Gabon and Nigeria. USA and Canada are 
practically the only countries where people from Cameroon live outside Europe and 
Africa. 
Figure 23: Total migrant stock for Cameroon at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Chad 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Despite being oil producer 
and exporter, Chad is rather 
poor compared to other 
African countries. Extraction 
of oil is not very high, with 
average early production not 
exceeding 100 thousand 
bpd. Practically all this 
volume is exported.   
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Government revenues (in 
relation to GDP) have 
declined in 8 percentage 
points since 2012. However, 
2012 levels are expected to 
regain by 2017. This will 
help to reduce the 
deterioration in the fiscal 
balance. Current account 
balance has been also 
affected by lower oil prices 
and is expected to be 
negative in the coming 
years. 
 
 
Table 11: Chad basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  13 211 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  13 922 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  29 648 
Current account balance (million US$, 2013) ... 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)   855 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   85.2 
            
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  3 600 
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  4 300 
      Source: WTO database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Chad macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
Over 200 thousand of Chad citizens live abroad. Majority of them resides in the 
neighbouring countries: Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria. Outside Africa, some Chadians 
live in France and also in United Arab Emirates. 
Figure 25: Total migrant stock for Cameroon at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Republic of Congo 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
Republic of Congo is producing 
yearly almost 300 thousand bpd 
(281 thousand bpd in 2014), 
with stable level of production 
over the years. Over 90% of 
this production is exported.  
However - unlike for other oil 
exporting countries - export of 
oil is not so important in the 
country`s economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
Current account balance of 
Republic of Congo has been 
decreasing since 2010, and 
eventually changed from surplus 
into deficit. In the next few 
years however, improvement of 
balance is expected. 
Economy of country is expected 
to grow in the coming years, 
but the rate of growth might be 
declining in the end of decade.  
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Republic of Congo basic indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  4 559 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  14 135 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  28 215 
Current account balance (million US$, 2007) - 2 181 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)  4 740 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   146.2 
      
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014) 
 8 263 
Merchandise imports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014) 
 6 200 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.04 
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   1.5 
Fuels and mining products   50.4 
Manufactures   22.5 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 26: Republic of Congo macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
Total number of migrants from Republic of Congo reaches 220 thousand people (nearly 
5% of its population). Half of them live in other African countries: Mali, Tanzania and 
South Africa being the most important. Out of 100 thousand Congo migrants living in 
Europe, France is a home for 70 thousand. 
 
Figure 27: Total migrant stock for Republic of Congo at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of 
destination (thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Gabon 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Gabon is relatively rich country 
in Africa. Oil production in Gabon 
in the last decade was on the 
stable level of around 200-250 
thousand bpd (236 thousand 
bpd in 2014). The country has 
high trade to GDP ratio and also 
high share of fuels in total 
export. These suggest that 
Gabon economy might be 
vulnerable to oil market 
fluctuations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Lower oil prices have had an 
important effect on the fiscal and 
current account balances. 
Government revenue declined in 
9 percentage points of GDP from 
2013 to 2015.  In the same 
period, current account balance 
has deteriorated in 20 
percentage points of GDP. GDP 
growth rate has decline from 7% 
in 2011 to 3.5% in 2015. From 
2016, an improvement of the 
economy is expected. 
 
 
Table 13: Gabon Basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  1 711 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  17 228 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  32 130 
Current account balance (million US$, 2005)  1 983 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)  8 922 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   82.9 
            
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  8 926 
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  2 993 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.05
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   7.3 
Fuels and mining products   89.1 
Manufactures   3.1 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 28: Gabon macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
Gabon is small country and therefore migration is very small – only 64 thousand people. 
Most of them live in Mali in Africa and in France in Europe. 
 
Figure 29: Total migrant stock for Gabon at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Africa Europe Rest of World
Other
Other European
France
Other African
Mali
  
 
54 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Equatorial Guinea (due to 
production and export of oil) 
is one of the richest 
countries in Africa. In 2014 
it produced 281 thousand 
bpd. Trade to GDP ratio 
exceeds 100%, and export 
is almost as large as total 
GDP. 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Government revenues have 
declined in 5 percentage 
points of GDP since 2011 
and will go on reducing in 
the coming years. The 
adjustment of fiscal policies 
could help to reduce fiscal 
deficit. Current account 
balance may also reduce its 
deficit in the coming years. 
GDP declined by 10% in 
2015 and positive growth 
rates are expected in the 
coming years. 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Equatorial Guinea basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)   778 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  14 308 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  25 105 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014) ... 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)  36 473 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   168.7 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  12 600
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  6 500 
Source: WTO database 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Equatorial Guinea macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
Equatorial Guinea has relatively high migration which exceeds 10% of total population. 
Most of the migrants live in the neighbour country – Gabon. In Europe there is a 
considerable population living in Spain (around 20 thousand).  
 
Figure 31: Total migrant stock for Equatorial Guinea at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of 
destination (thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Nigeria 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Nigeria is the largest 
economy in Africa, and 
because of its size, trade to 
GDP ratio is relatively small 
(33%). Despite the size of 
Nigerian economy, export is 
heavily dependent on the oil 
and other fuels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Government revenue has 
declined in 10 percentage 
points since 2011. In 2015 
the deficit of the fiscal 
balance was around 3% of 
the GDP and improvements 
are not expected. Current 
account balance has also 
deteriorated in recent years. 
GDP growth rates above 4% 
are expected in the coming 
years.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Nigeria basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  178 517 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  568 508 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014) 
1 049 
102 
Current account balance (million US$, 2012)  20 353 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)   978 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   33.0 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  97 000
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  60 000 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.51
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   8.3 
Fuels and mining products   79.9 
Manufactures   3.4 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 32: Nigeria macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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57 
 
Migration stock 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, so it should not be surprise that has also 
significant number of citizens living abroad. The most important direction of migration is 
USA, where currently live quarter million of Nigerians. In Europe live 400 thousand 
Nigerians. The most important countries of residence are United Kingdom (216 
thousand) and Italy (56 thousand). Nevertheless Africa is also region, where many 
Nigerians reside, Cameroon and Ghana being the most important countries.  
 
Figure 33: Total migrant stock for Nigeria at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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South Sudan34 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Oil production and export is 
important sector in the 
economy of South Sudan. In 
2014 country had produced 
159 thousand bpd, and the 
number is increasing every 
year. Despite being oil 
producer, country is still one 
of the poorest in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
In the coming years, South 
Sudanese economy is 
expected to notice solid 
growth exceeding 5% per 
year. This should lead to 
increase in the government 
revenue (in relation to GDP).   
Nevertheless permanently 
high budget deficit is going 
to drastically inflate 
government debt by the end 
of this decade.    
 
 
 
 
Table 16: South Sudan basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014) 11 384 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  14 304 
Source: IMF database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: South Sudan macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
 
 
                                               
34 Due to scarcity of data about South Sudan, table with basic indicators is incomplete (and also 
based on different source than for other countries). 
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Migration stock 
South Sudan has large diaspora of citizens living outside country. Most of them reside in 
neighbour countries: Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya. Outside Africa lives relatively small 
number of people. Migration to Europe is very small – less than one thousand. Almost all 
of them live in Norway. 
 
Figure 35: Total migrant stock for South Sudan at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Sudan 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
Sudan had extracted 109 
thousand bpd in 2014. After 
secession of South Sudan, 
role of oil in Sudanese 
economy has dropped and 
now oil export constitutes 
less than one third of total 
export.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
After secession of South Sudan 
in 2011, economy of Sudan 
experienced drastic drop of 
its performance - GDP, 
current account balance and 
government revenue were 
deteriorated. After that, 
however economy recovered 
and it seems that it is going 
towards balanced growth in 
the coming years.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Sudan basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  38 764 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  73 815 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  160 111 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014) - 4 849 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)   419 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   23.5 
      Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  4 350 
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  9 211 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.02 
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   19.9 
Fuels and mining products   29.0 
Manufactures   3.0 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 36: Sudan macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration stock 
Sudan has huge population of migrants reaching nearly 2 m people. Other African 
countries (South Sudan, Chad and Uganda) as well as oil exporting Middle East countries 
(Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) are the most important directions of 
migration from Sudan. In Europe live relatively few Sudanese people – mainly in United 
Kingdom. 
 
Figure 37: Total migrant stock for Sudan at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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62 
Middle Eastern countries 
Iran 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Production of oil in Iran was 
significant 3.6 m bpd in 2014. 
In 2014, the ratio of oil export 
to the total oil production, the 
trade to GDP ratio and the 
share of fossil fuels in total 
export are all relatively low, as 
compared to other oil 
producers. Nevertheless the 
aggregation of fuels and 
mining products still account 
for 62% of total exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Although export of oil do not 
constitute so high share of 
Iranian economy as for some 
other Middle East oil exporters, 
the country is very dependent 
on oil revenues. Not only lower 
oil prices but also the oil 
embargo in 2012 has affected 
its economy in recent years. 
Nevertheless the lifting of the 
Iran embargo is expected to 
counteract the negative impact 
of the low oil price and the 
GDP is expected to grow by 
4% in the coming years. An 
improvement of both fiscal and 
current account balances was 
also expected.  
 
 
Table 18: Iran basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  78 470 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  415 339 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014) 
1 280 
896 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014) ... 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  2 320 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   36.7 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  88 800
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  51 000 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)  0.47 
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   6.7 
Fuels and mining products   62.3 
Manufactures   20.1 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 38: Iran macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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63 
Migration Stock 
There are over one million of Iranians living outside his country. Huge diaspora live in 
Northern America (USA and Canada) and also in the following European countries: 
Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden. Moreover many Iranians live in Israel and 
Australia (around 50 thousand in each country).    
 
Figure 39: Total migrant stock for Iran at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Iraq 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Production of oil in Iraq is 
comparable to the one in Iran. 
In 2014 production amounted 
to 3.3 m bpd. But the oil 
production is much more 
important for Iraq than Iran. 
Firstly it is because export to 
production is much higher and 
secondly oil is practically only 
product Iraq exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Government revenues have 
declined in 12 percentage 
points from 2011 to 2015. 
Consequently, fiscal balance 
has deteriorated in 27 
percentage points. Similarly, 
current account balance has 
changed from a 12% surplus in 
2011 to a 13% deficit in 2015. 
GDP growth rates declined 
sharply. In 2016, the economy 
is expected to recover and GDP 
could grow by 7% in the 
coming years. 
 
 
 
Table 19: Iraq basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  34 278 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  220 506 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  503 687 
Current account balance (million US$, 2012)  29 541 
Trade per capita (US$, 2011-2013)  4 604 
Trade to GDP ratio (2011-2013)   70.7 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  84 630
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  59 000 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.45
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   0.0 
Fuels and mining products   99.6 
Manufactures   0.2 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 40: Iraq macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration Stock 
Nearly 1.5 m Iraqis live in countries all over the world. In Asia the largest communities 
live in Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Israel. There are significant number of residents living in 
Europe, mainly in Sweden, Germany and United Kingdom. Over 200 thousand live in 
North America (USA and Canada). Other important countries are Libya and Australia.     
Figure 41: Total migrant stock for Iraq at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Saudi Arabia 
Oil production in the 
economy 
Saudi Arabia in 2014 was 
the second largest oil 
producer (after USA). With 
high ratio of trade to GDP 
and high share of oil export 
in total export, country`s 
economy seems to be 
heavily dependent on the 
oil. 
Perspectives 
The economy of Saudi 
Arabia is very dependent on 
oil revenues. Lower oil 
prices have had an 
important effect on the 
fiscal and current account 
balances. Government 
revenue declined in 16 
percentage points of GDP 
from 2012 to 2015. In the 
same period, current 
account balance 
deteriorated in 25 
percentage points of GDP. 
Although the economy is 
expected to recover in the 
coming years, government 
savings will vanish by 2017, 
and debt will sharply 
increase.    
Table 20: Saudi Arabia Basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  29 369 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  746 249 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014) 
1 603 
764 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014)  76 916 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  20 286 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   78.9 
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  353 836 
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  163 000 
Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   1.86 
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
By main commodity group: 
Agricultural products   1.0 
Fuels and mining products   81.0 
Manufactures   12.8 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 42: Saudi Arabia macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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67 
Migration Stock 
Saudi Arabians live in many regions all over the world. Single one the most important 
country is USA, where live 60 thousand of them. Other important countries of residence 
are: United Kingdom, Libya, Canada and the State of Palestine. 
 
Figure 43: Total migrant stock for Saudi Arabia at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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United Arab 
Emirates 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
United Arab Emirates is 
second largest oil producer 
in the Middle East (after 
Saudi Arabia) and the 
extraction of oil in the 2014 
reached 3.7 m bpd. 
Although being such a large 
producer, UAE economy is 
not so much dependent on 
oil as in the other Persian 
Gulf countries.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
Decline in the oil price has 
deteriorated economic 
performance of country. 
Large current account 
surplus has gone down 
almost to zero. General 
government revenue to GDP 
ratio has decreased from 
40% in 2013 to 30% in 
2015 (and is expected to 
stay on this level in the next 
few years).  
GDP growth has also 
decreased, but still country 
is expected to grow at rate 
of 3% per year.  
 
 
 
 
Table 21: United Arab Emirates basic indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  9 446 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  401 647 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  599 769 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014) ... 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  73 002 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   173.8 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  360 000
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  262 000 
      Share in world total exports in 2014(%)   1.89
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   2.2 
Fuels and mining products   31.0 
Manufactures   23.6 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 44: United Arab Emirates macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration Stock 
Migration from United Arab Emirates reaches 137 thousand people, with majority of this 
population living in other Asian countries: Kuwait, Oman, India and State of Palestine. In 
Europe live less than 20 thousand UAE citizens –most of them in United Kingdom. There 
is also relatively large diaspora living in North America: Canada and USA. 
 
Figure 45: Total migrant stock for United Arab Emirates at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of 
destination (thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Other countries 
Canada 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Canada is one of the largest 
oil producers, constantly 
increasing volume of 
production. In the last 20 
years production almost 
doubled from around 2.3 m 
bpd in 1994 to nearly 4.3 m 
bpd in 2014. Being 
developed country, oil 
export does not play the 
most important role in 
Canada`s trade (only one 
third of its export are fuels).  
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Canada, whose economy is 
more diversified, has been 
hardly affected by lower oil 
prices. Government 
revenues reduce slightly in 
2014. The higher revenues 
in the coming years will help 
to reduce government fiscal 
deficit. 
 
 
Table 22: Canada basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  35 540 
GDP (million current US$, 2014) 1 786 655 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014) 1 566 925 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014) ... 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  32 451 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   62.7 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  474 709
Merchandise imports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  475 000 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   2.50
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   14.3 
Fuels and mining products   33.8 
Manufactures   44.7 
Source: WTO database 
Figure 46: Canada macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
 Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration Stock 
Canada has relatively high (compared to the total population) number (1.2 m) of citizens 
living abroad. Most of them live in the USA, United Kingdom and Australia.    
Figure 47: Total migrant stock for Canada at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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72 
Norway 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Norway is the largest 
European oil producer (after 
Russia) with production 1.9 m 
bpd in 2014.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
Although fiscal balance has 
been affected by lower oil 
prices, government savings 
are still increasing. Current 
account balance deteriorated 
in 5 percentage points from 
2012 to 2015, but still is 
positive. 
 
 
 
 
Table 23: Norway basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  5 136 
GDP (million current US$, 2014)  500 103 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014)  333 322 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014)  47 163 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  68 266 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   67.9 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  143 893
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$, 2014)  89 185 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   0.76
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   8.8 
Fuels and mining products   69.3 
Manufactures   17.5 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 48: Norway macroeconomic indicators (% GDP)  
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration Stock 
Almost 200 thousand Norwegians live in other countries – mainly in Europe, in countries 
like Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom and Spain. There is a community of Norwegians 
living in USA and Canada. In Bangladesh live nearly 15 thousand.  
Figure 49: Total migrant stock for Norway at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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Russia 
 
Oil production in the 
economy 
 
Russia is one of the most 
important world oil producers 
with the production 
exceeding 10 m bpd. Half of 
this number is being 
exported. As Russia is large 
economy, the share of trade 
in GDP in not very high - 
52.1%. Export of fuels (oil, 
gas and coal) is quite 
important part of Russian 
export. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives 
 
GDP growth rates have 
sharply declined in recent 
years. In 2015, GDP declined 
by 4%. From 2014 to 2015 
government revenue 
decreased in 3.5 percentage 
points of GDP, deteriorating 
fiscal balance. On the other 
hand, current account 
balance has improved in 
recent years. 
 
 
Table 24: Russia basic Indicators 
Population (thousands, 2014)  143 820 
GDP (million current US$, 2014) 1 860 598 
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2014) 3 745 157 
Current account balance (million US$, 2014)  58 431 
Trade per capita (US$, 2012-2014)  7 207 
Trade to GDP ratio (2012-2014)   52.1 
    
  Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  497 764
Merchandise imports, f.o.b. (million US$, 2014)  308 027 
      Share in world total exports in 2014 (%)   2.62
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
(shares in total export) 
 
By main commodity group: 
 Agricultural products   6.2 
Fuels and mining products   70.3 
Manufactures   20.8 
Source: WTO database 
 
Figure 50: Russia macroeconomic indicators (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook database. 
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Migration Stock 
Russia is a country with one of the largest community of migrants (in absolute 
numbers). Out of over 10 m people living outside Russia, 6 m live in European countries. 
The most important ones are: Ukraine, Germany and Belarus. In the former USSR 
republics live 3.7 m Russians, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan having the largest Russian 
communities. Half million live in USA and Canada and 100 thousand in Israel.  
 
Figure 51: Total migrant stock for Russia at mid-year of 2015 by major area and country of destination 
(thousands of people) 
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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JRC Mission 
As the Commission’s  
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policies with independent,  
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its know-how with  
the Member States,  
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and international partners. 
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